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The Lack of Money is the Root of All Evil: 
Louisiana’s Ban on Bail Without Surety 
INTRODUCTION 
Two brothers are arrested for the same crime—possession of 
marijuana with the intent to distribute.1 They are in all respects the same 
man: they have the same education, the same criminal record, and the same 
ties to the community. They differ in only one respect: one brother has 
money, while the other has none. Nevertheless, Louisiana law does not 
treat these brothers the same. In fact, the brother with money will quickly 
be out of jail, while the indigent brother will stay incarcerated for the entire 
pretrial duration. The two brothers will experience vastly different pretrial 
outcomes, solely because of their respective wealth. 
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 334.4 imposes a ban on 
judges releasing defendants on their own recognizance when they are 
charged with certain crimes.2 This ban might violate an indigent 
defendant’s right to procedural due process, right to equal protection under 
the law, and right to be free from excessive bail. Execution of the article 
carries with it a host of deleterious effects.3 Litigation on the issue, 
however, is rare. Because Article 334.4 exclusively governs bail, it applies 
only to pretrial detention. Any challenge to the law therefore faces issues 
of mootness and ripeness. There exists only one federal case in which a 
petitioner challenged the law. In 2014, an arrestee challenged Article 334.4 
in Faulkner v. Gusman, arguing that it violated his right to procedural due 
process and his right to be free from excessive bail.4 Although the 
challenge was unsuccessful, many of the concerns raised by the petitioner 
remain. 
Article 334.4 should be repealed. The article violates equal protection 
rights by imposing pretrial detention on the extremely indigent solely 
because of their inability to pay. This pretrial detention is statistically 
linked to increased recidivism and poor trial outcomes. Article 334.4 
violates due process by denying defendants the chance to show that they 
are not a flight risk and that pretrial detention is not needed. Finally, the 
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 1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 (2016). 
 2. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334.4 (2016). Releasing a defendant on his own 
recognizance means releasing him for no monetary fee. Some jurisdictions refer to 
this as “bail without surety.” 
 3. See infra Part IV. 
 4. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 (E.D. La. May 9, 
2014). 
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article violates the constitutional prohibition on excessive bail by mandating 
bail even in cases where none is needed to ensure that the accused attends 
trial. 
Part I of this Comment provides a historical overview of bail, due 
process, and Article 334.4. Part II discusses the challenge put forth in 
Faulkner v. Gusman, including the state’s responses to the petition and the 
ultimate judgment of the court. In Part III, newly released data on 
Louisiana bond amounts is used to dispute several claims of the Faulkner 
court and analyze the constitutionality of Article 334.4, concluding that 
the article potentially violates procedural due process, equal protection, 
and the excessive bail clauses of the Louisiana and the United States 
constitutions. Finally, Part IV provides reasons for the repeal of Article 
334.4 and explores policy considerations pursuant to such an action, 
including the effects of pretrial detention on conviction rates and 
sentencing. 
I. BAIL, ARTICLE 334.4, AND POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES: A BRIEF PRIMER 
Understanding the history of bail, due process, and equal protection is 
necessary to understand the constitutional issues of Article 334.4. Bail 
originated as an early Anglo-Saxon practice designed to manage a lack of 
prisons. Over the centuries, it developed into a protection for citizens from 
their government.5 Bail determinations in the United States are intimately 
related to due process, which is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.6 The Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection under the law also serves to protect indigent 
citizens from unjust outcomes in criminal trials.7 Louisiana’s passage of 
Article 334.4 implicates issues of excessive bail, due process, and equal 
protection. 
                                                                                                             
 5. TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUDICIAL INST., THE HISTORY OF 
BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 3 (2010), http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-
reports/PJI-History%20of%20Bail%20Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UGP-HS7G] 
(“[Over 500 years, the English] Parliament focused on adding safeguards to the bail 
process to protect persons from political abuse and local corruption.”).  
 6. See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 7. See generally Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe 
Indigent Defense Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197 (2013). 
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A. A Brief History of Bail 
The practice of bail has a history extending back millennia to the early 
Roman Republic.8 Bail originally existed as a practical solution to the rarity 
of prisons in the Anglo-Saxon period; in modern times, it has developed into 
a required aspect of due process and the presumption of innocence. In 
Anglo-Saxon England, an accused man would be released before trial if a 
surety “would guarantee both the appearance of the accused at trial and 
payment of [monetary fines] upon conviction.”9 Were the accused to flee 
before trial, he would be presumed guilty, and the surety would be required 
to pay the monetary fines of his conviction.10 Bail, therefore, was set at the 
amount that would be paid should the accused be found guilty. 
1. Bail in England 
In 1275, the English Parliament passed the Statute of Westminster, 
which modified the bail practices of the earlier Anglo-Saxon period.11 The 
Statute required that sheriffs deny bail to three groups: (1) prisoners who 
committed certain offenses; (2) those who self-incriminated, were caught in 
the act, or were excommunicated; and (3) those who had attempted escape 
or “those of ill fame or bad character.”12 For such a statute to be passed, it 
would seem necessary that bail be granted frequently to the accused, if not 
by default. Magna Carta’s requirement that no man be divested of liberty or 
property without due process clearly shows that the English celebrated a 
basic presumption of innocence.13 This presumption, codified in 1215, could 
not have been forgotten by the passing of the Statute of Westminster 60 
                                                                                                             
 8. SCHNACKE, supra note 5, at 1. See also Andrew Lyons, Ancient Roman 
Precedent for the Taking of Bail, HEARSAY, http://www.hearsay.org.au 
/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=127&Itemid=48 [https://perma.cc 
/PD64-NHCA] (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) (“There is a record of bail being taken as 
far back as about 461 BC.”). 
 9. June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery 
of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 519–
20 (1983). 
 10. Id. at 520.  
 11. Id. at 523.  
 12. Id. at 520 n.38.  
 13. MAGNA CARTA *39 (Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut 
disseisiatur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur . . . nisi per 
legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terre. Literally, “No free man may 
be taken, or imprisoned, or deprived of property, or outlawed, or exiled, or by any 
other mode brought to ruin . . . except by the legal judgment of his equals or by 
the law of the land.”). 
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years later; the Statute served to temper Magna Carta’s liberal bail rules. By 
the time of the American Declaration of Independence, bail in the United 
Kingdom had become a strong shield of liberty against the Crown.14 
2. Bail in the United States  
Bail practices in the United States originated from this long history of 
bail in the United Kingdom. In the 17th century, Parliament passed multiple 
bills of legislation granting subjects of the Crown increased rights of bail.15 
Among these were (1) the Petition of Right, which forbade courts to detain 
subjects without charging them; (2) the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which 
created procedural safeguards to prevent lengthy pretrial delays; and (3) the 
English Bill of Rights of 1689, which stated that “excessive bail ought not 
be required.”16 The United States Constitution, mirroring this latter 
convention, established that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.”17 The 
United States Supreme Court has held that “[u]nless [the] right to bail before 
trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries 
of struggle, would lose its meaning.”18 In United States v. Salerno, the Court 
held constitutional the Bail Reform Act, which permits federal courts to 
deny bail to certain dangerous arrestees;19 however, it stipulated that “[i]n 
our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is 
the carefully limited exception.”20 
The federal system of bail follows this guideline. Federal law prohibits 
a judicial officer from “impos[ing] a financial condition that results in the 
pretrial detention of the person.”21 The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
however, has repeatedly held that a defendant’s inability to post bail does 
not by itself render a bail setting unconstitutionally excessive.22 The court 
                                                                                                             
 14. Carbone, supra note 9, at 528. 
 15. Id. 
 16. SCHNACKE, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 18. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (holding that bail had been assigned 
in excess when the district court had assigned $50,000 bail to members of the 
Communist Party solely on the basis that former arrestees charged with violating 
the same law had forfeited bail). 
 19. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that the Bail 
Reform Act, which permits federal courts to deny bail to certain dangerous 
arrestees, was constitutional). 
 20. Id. at 755. 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2012). 
 22. United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that a $750,000 bail was not excessive, because “only a substantial financial 
component” would reasonably assure the court of the defendant’s appearance) 
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has also held that the interpretation of federal bail law claiming that district 
courts were barred from setting a level of bail that the defendant could not 
afford to post was “inconsistent with the total fabric of the Bail Reform Act 
of 1984, as amended in 1986, inconsistent with apparent congressional 
purpose, and not supported by the legislative history.”23 Rather, the court 
has held that the Bail Reform Act merely “proscrib[es] the setting of a high 
bail as a de facto automatic detention practice.”24 
The states are free to pursue other systems of bail within the constraints 
of the Eighth Amendment. Louisiana’s Constitution of 1978, mirroring the 
United States Constitution, prohibits excessive bail but does not grant a right 
to bail.25 Louisiana law requires that bail be assessed under ten factors and 
                                                                                                             
(citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the 
constitutionality of a Florida bail law was moot because the Supreme Court of 
Florida had promulgated a new law superseding it)); United States v. James, 674 
F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that under 18 U.S.C.S. § 3146, a trial judge 
may amend conditions of release set by a magistrate); United States v. Beaman, 
631 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a local federal rule requiring defendant 
to post real property within the jurisdiction of the district court with twice the 
value of the bond to obtain release was in conflict with 18 U.S.C. § 3146); 
Williams v. Farrior, 626 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (holding that a plaintiff 
failed to adequately assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 when a sheriff 
refused to approve a bond, because the plaintiff did not possess an absolute right 
to bail). 
 23. McConnell, 842 F.2d at 108. 
 24. Id. at 109. It should be noted that for the purposes of this analysis, a “high 
bail” is “a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person,” 
as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2). 
 25. LA. CONST. art. I, § 18 reads: 
A. Excessive bail shall not be required. — Before and during a trial, a person 
shall be bailable by sufficient surety, except when he is charged with a 
capital offense and the proof is evident and the presumption of guilt is great. 
After conviction and before sentencing, a person shall be bailable if the 
maximum sentence which may be imposed is imprisonment for five years 
or less; and the judge may grant bail if the maximum sentence which may 
be imposed is imprisonment exceeding five years. After sentencing and 
until final judgment, a person shall be bailable if the sentence actually 
imposed is five years or less; and the judge may grant bail if the sentence 
actually imposed exceeds imprisonment for five years.  
B. However, a person charged with a crime of violence as defined by law 
or with production, manufacture, distribution, or dispensing or possession 
with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled 
dangerous substance as defined by the Louisiana Controlled Dangerous 
Substances Law, and the proof is evident and the presumption of guilt is 
great, shall not be bailable if, after a contradictory hearing, the judge or 
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“insure the presence of the defendant, as required, and the safety of any other 
person and the community.”26 Louisiana’s Code of Criminal Procedure 
explicitly defines bail as “the security given by a person to assure his 
appearance before the proper court whenever required.”27 In 2012, the 
Louisiana legislature enacted Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 
334.4, which provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, any 
defendant who has been arrested . . . shall not be released by the court 
on the defendant’s own recognizance or on the signature of any other 
person [when arrested for] . . . the production, manufacturing, 
distribution, or dispensing or the possession with the intent to 
produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled dangerous 
substance in violation of R.S. 40:966(B), 967(B), 968(B), 969(B), or 
970(B) of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.28 
                                                                                                             
magistrate finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial 
risk that the person may flee or poses an imminent danger to any other 
person or the community. 
 26. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334 (2016). The ten factors are:  
(1) The seriousness of the offense charged, including but not limited to 
whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a controlled 
dangerous substance. 
(2) The weight of the evidence against the defendant. 
(3) The previous criminal record of the defendant. 
(4) The ability of the defendant to give bail. 
(5) The nature and seriousness of the danger to any other person or the 
community that would be posed by the defendant’s release. 
(6) The defendant’s voluntary participation in a pretrial drug testing 
program. 
(7) The absence or presence of any controlled dangerous substance in the 
defendant’s blood at the time of arrest. 
(8) Whether the defendant is currently out on bond on a previous felony 
arrest for which he is awaiting institution of prosecution, arraignment, 
trial, or sentencing. 
(9) Any other circumstances affecting the probability of defendant’s 
appearance. 
(10) The type or form of bail. 
 27. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 311 (2016). 
 28. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334.4 (2016). This law also prohibits release 
on the arrestee’s recognizance when accused of: vehicular homicide, 
cyberstalking with two prior convictions for the same offense, aggravated 
kidnapping of a child, killing a child during delivery, human experimentation, 
cruelty to persons with infirmities with a prior conviction for the same offense, 
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This law implicates issues of due process and equal protection. By 
forbidding bail hearings in cases of possession of controlled substances with 
the intent to distribute, Article 334.4 denies arrestees the right to be heard in 
a meaningful manner during a critical phase of detention.  
B. Facial Challenges to Due Process29 
The United States Constitution guarantees a right to due process in state 
criminal proceedings.30 The U.S. Supreme Court has defined “[t]he 
fundamental requisite of due process of law [as] the opportunity to be heard 
. . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”31 This “opportunity 
to be heard” is the procedural component of due process. Due process also 
contains a substantive component that protects a small set of rights “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty,”32 regardless of procedure, unless the 
government interference serves a compelling state interest.33 Louisiana’s 
constitution and jurisprudence generally mirror that of the federal law.34 
                                                                                                             
operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a prior conviction for the same offense, 
aggravated cruelty to animals, and the injury or killing of a police animal. Id.  
 29. A facial challenge is a challenge in which a petitioner seeks to show that 
“no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be [constitutionally] 
valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[No] State [shall] deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 31. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (citations omitted) (holding 
that due process required a hearing before the termination of welfare). 
 32. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937). 
 33. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (holding that a law generally 
requiring that minors detained before deportation may only be released to parents, 
relatives, or guardians does not violate due process) (“[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments' guarantee of ‘due process of law’ . . . include[s] a substantive 
component, which forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ 
liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement 
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); see also Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (holding that a law banning euthanasia 
served a legitimate government interest and therefore did not violate due process) 
(“The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it 
protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.”). 
 34. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, except by due process of law.”). See also In re Adoption of B.G.S., 
556 So. 2d 545, 549 (La. 1990) (holding that statutes allowing a mother to 
surrender children for adoption without putting the name of the unwed father on 
the birth certificate violated the father’s right to due process) (“The central 
meaning of procedural due process is well settled: Persons whose rights may be 
affected by State action are entitled to be heard, and in order that they may enjoy 
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The guiding jurisprudence for procedural due process challenges35 is 
derived from Mathews v. Eldridge, in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
established a test that weighs three factors.36 First, a court must examine 
whether the challenged procedure affects a “private interest.”37 Second, 
the court must determine the risk that the challenged procedure will 
“erroneous[ly] depriv[e]” a person of that interest and the “probable value, 
if any, of additional procedural safeguards.”38 Finally, the court must 
decide whether the government has a sufficient interest to justify the 
procedure in light of the prior two factors.39 Substantive due process 
analysis is therefore incorporated into the Mathews test; if a challenged 
procedure violates a liberty protected by substantive due process, only a 
sufficiently compelling government interest will rescue the procedure 
from being declared unconstitutional.40 A law that is procedurally sound, 
however, may still discriminate against different members of the 
citizenry.41 Such a law is vulnerable to a challenge under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
                                                                                                             
that right, they must first be notified. It is equally fundamental that the right to 
notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and 
in a meaningful manner.”); Babineaux v. Judiciary Commission, 341 So. 2d 396, 
400 (La. 1976) (holding that a canon of the code of judicial conduct “prohibiting 
judges from serving on the board of directors of financial institutions” does not 
violate judges’ rights to due process) (“Substantive due process may be broadly 
defined as the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his life, liberty, or property. The essence of substantive due process is 
protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action.”). 
 35. Strictly speaking, the Mathews test is more properly applied as the third 
stage of a due process analysis, after the questions “Is there a liberty deprivation?” 
and “Is the deprivation of life, liberty or property?” See Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871 (2000) (discussing the 
steps of procedural due process questions). 
 36. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (holding that evidentiary 
hearings were not required by due process before the termination of disability). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Court 
must evaluate statutes infringing on substantive due process by means of strict 
scrutiny). 
 41. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Edu. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (holding that 
segregation of educational facilities violated equal protection). 
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C. Facial Challenges to Equal Protection 
The Constitution requires that states grant equal protection under the 
law to all persons within their jurisdictions.42 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted this requirement to mean that poverty cannot be the sole cause 
of incarceration.43 For this reason, many statutory bail schemes risk 
running afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The Fifth Circuit has a long history of cases involving criminal 
prosecutions, indigence, and equal protection. It has defined “equal 
protection of the laws” to mean, inter alia, “the right to be tried and 
punished in the same manner as others accused of crime are tried and 
punished,”44 and the Fifth Circuit has further held that “[t]o imprison an 
indigent when in the same circumstances an individual of financial means 
would remain free constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws.”45 
Varden v. City of Clanton, a case from early 2015, is illustrative. In 
Varden, an indigent woman was imprisoned because of her inability to pay 
an amount of money required by the City of Clanton’s bail schedule and 
filed suit against the city.46 In the suit, she alleged a violation of her 
                                                                                                             
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. (“[No] State [shall] . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 43. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding that a defendant was 
unconstitutionally sentenced to prison solely because he could not pay fines); 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (holding that an inmate could 
not be kept beyond the duration of his incarceration if he were unable to pay fines) 
(“We conclude that when the aggregate imprisonment exceeds the maximum 
period fixed by the statute and results directly from an involuntary nonpayment 
of a fine or court costs we are confronted with an impermissible discrimination 
that rests on ability to pay.”); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) (holding 
that a state’s refusal to docket a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the 
petitioner was unable to pay a $4 fee) (“[T]o interpose any financial consideration 
between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue 
for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws.”); Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that a state’s refusal to furnish 
prisoners with copies of their trial records for their appeal because they were 
unable to pay constituted discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment) (“[T]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets 
depends on the amount of money he has.”). 
 44. Lynch v. U.S., 189 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 1951). 
 45. Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 
439 U.S. 1041 (1978). 
 46. First Amended Class Action Complaint, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 
2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (N.D. Ala. filed Jan. 15, 2015). 
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Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.47 The United States filed 
a statement of interest in support of the petitioner.48 In this statement of 
interest, the United States claimed that incarcerating arrestees solely on 
the grounds that they could not pay for release, regardless of the nature of 
the required payment, is a violation of equal protection.49 
In terms of reviewing the constitutionality of bail schemes, an equal 
protection analysis may apply varying levels of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is 
appropriate when a law prevents the free exercise of a fundamental right 
or discriminates against a suspect class of individuals.50 The indigent 
might be specified as a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause.51 
For a law to pass strict scrutiny, it must be “narrowly tailored to further 
compelling governmental interests.”52 Due process and equal protection, 
however, do not provide the only potential challenges to bail laws. 
Arrestees have a constitutional protection against excessive bail. 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. 
 48. Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Varden v. City of Clanton, 
No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (N.D. Ala. filed Jan. 15, 2015) (“The United States has 
authority to file this Statement of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 517, which 
permits the Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United States in any 
case pending in a federal court. The United States can enforce the rights of the 
incarcerated pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1997.”). 
 49. Id. at 1. 
 50. Mass. Bd. Of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (holding 
that strict scrutiny was an improper test to use in analyzing a statute mandating 
retirement at 50 for state police). 
 51. See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973) 
(holding that a system of school funding based on local taxation passed rational 
basis scrutiny and therefore did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment) (“[T]here 
are other classifications that, at least in some settings, are also ‘suspect’—for 
example, those based upon national origin, alienage, indigency, or illegitimacy.”); 
but see Henry Rose, The Poor as a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection 
Clause: An Open Constitutional Question, 34 NOVA L. REV. 407 (2010) (claiming 
that the status of the poor under the Equal Protection Clause remains an open 
question). 
 52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (holding that diversity 
standards for Michigan law schools passed strict scrutiny and did not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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D. Excessive Bail 
The United States Constitution prohibits excessive bail.53 The United 
States Supreme Court has not determined, however, whether the Eighth 
Amendment grants citizens a fundamental right to bail.54 The Court has 
suggested that because the Eighth Amendment originates from the English 
Bill of Rights Act, from which English courts have not found a right to 
bail, no such right stems from the Eighth Amendment.55 Still, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana has held that a 
“limited fundamental right to bail” exists.56 This limited fundamental right 
grants “fair access to the bail system for those who, after an individualized 
judicial determination, qualify for pretrial release.”57 The Fifth Circuit has 
since held that “there is no absolute constitutional right to bail.”58 
E. Challenges to Article 334.4 
Despite these constitutional concerns, challenges to Article 334.4 are 
rare. Because Article 334.4 is applicable only to arrestees before their trial, 
challenges face issues of mootness and ripeness. If arrestees challenge 
their pretrial detention after they post bond or receive a trial, their claims 
are mooted.59 If citizens challenge Article 334.4 before their arrest, their 
                                                                                                             
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 54. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (holding that an Illinois 
bail scheme did not violate equal protection or due process) (“But we are not at 
all concerned here with any fundamental right to bail or with any Eighth 
Amendment-Fourteenth Amendment question of bail excessiveness.”). 
 55. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1952) (holding that the denial 
of bail to aliens did not violate the eighth amendment) (“The bail clause was lifted 
with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause 
has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide 
that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When 
this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indicated 
any different concept. . . . Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to 
say all arrests must be bailable. We think, clearly, here that the Eighth Amendment 
does not require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of these cases.”).  
 56. Augustus v. Roemer, 771 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (E.D. La. 1991). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 59. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975) (finding that the majority 
of claims regarding pretrial detention must be “capable of repetition yet evading 
review” in order to avoid mootness). 
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claims are not ripe.60 The window to make a successful challenge against 
Article 334.4 is therefore very small; however, in 2014, an arrestee made 
a timely challenge to the law on several grounds.61 This suit provides an 
excellent lens into the current state of opinion on Article 334.4. 
II. FAULKNER V. GUSMAN: THE CURRENT STATE 
OF JURISPRUDENCE ON ARTICLE 334.4 
In 2013, Milton Faulkner challenged Article 334.4 in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, claiming that the law 
violated both his right to be free from excessive bail and his right to due 
process.62 Faulkner had been arrested for possession with intent to 
distribute and was denied release on his own recognizance under Article 
334.4, even though he posed virtually no risk for flight or recidivism.63 
Faulkner filed for habeas corpus relief in the Eastern District of Louisiana, 
alleging that his due process rights were being violated.64 After a series of 
filings by Faulkner and the state, the court denied Faulkner’s petition, 
holding that Article 334.4 served a legitimate public interest and that 
Faulkner’s facial challenge to the article’s constitutionality failed to prove 
that the law was unconstitutional in every application.65 
A. Background of the Case 
In September 2013, Milton Faulkner was arrested for possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute and was booked in Orleans Parish 
Prison.66 The next day, New Orleans Pretrial Services screened Faulkner 
and determined that he had no prior convictions and was in the lowest risk 
category for reoffending or fleeing.67 Following his screening, Faulkner 
appeared in magistrate court for a “first appearance,” which combines the 
                                                                                                             
 60. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not 
ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur 
as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”). 
 61. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 
2014 WL 1876213 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014). 
 62. Id. at *3. 
 63. Id. at *5. 
 64. Id. at *3. 
 65. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 (E.D. La. May 9, 
2014).  
 66. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 
2014 WL 1876213 at *2 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014). 
 67. Id. at *5. 
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probable cause hearing and bond determination required by law.68 Under 
Article 334.4, the court was unable to consider the option of releasing 
Faulkner on his own recognizance.69 The court set Faulkner’s bond at 
$30,000.70  
B. Initial Complaint 
Faulkner filed a motion with the state district court alleging that his 
bond had been unconstitutionally set, in violation of his right to due 
process and freedom from excessive bail.71 The court denied his motion, 
and the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal and Louisiana Supreme 
Court denied review.72 On January 15, 2014, Faulkner filed a petition in 
federal district court for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.73 
Faulkner argued that Article 334.4 was unconstitutional “because it 
deprive[d] [him] of an individualized hearing where a judge may 
determine the appropriateness of a recognizance bond and results in 
excessive bail for indigents who cannot post monetary bond.”74  
Faulkner analogized Article 334.4 to a hypothetical bond restriction 
analyzed in Pugh v. Rainwater.75 In Pugh, the Fifth Circuit analyzed a Florida 
law on bail that created a presumption against release on one’s own 
recognizance.76 The court held that although the Florida law was not facially 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause,77 a situation in which “an indigent, 
whose appearance at trial could reasonably be assured by one of the alternate 
forms of release, [was subject to] pretrial confinement for inability to post 
money bail would constitute imposition of an excessive restraint.”78 Faulkner 
argued that Article 334.4 went “much further” than the hypothetical law 
determined to be unconstitutional in Pugh, because Article 334.4 is an outright 
ban on recognizance bonds when an arrestee is charged with a specific 
crime.79 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. (citing State v. Wallace, 25 So. 3d 720, 725 (2009)). 
 69. Id. at *2–3. 
 70. Id. at *3. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at *7. 
 75. Id. at *8. 
 76. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 77. Id. at 1056. 
 78. Id. at 1058. 
 79. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 
2014 WL 1876213 at *8 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014). 
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Faulkner claimed that Article 334.4 failed the three-factor Mathews test 
and therefore violated his procedural due process rights.80 First, Faulkner 
argued that an arrestee’s interest in pretrial release satisfied the first factor,81 
because such an interest in release is a “private interest . . . affected by the 
official action.”82 Second, he argued that prohibiting judges from considering 
the possibility of releasing an arrestee on his own recognizance satisfied the 
second factor83 by increasing the risk of “erroneous deprivation” of his liberty 
interest in release.84 Third, Faulkner claimed that prohibiting release on one’s 
own recognizance satisfied no legitimate government interest because judges 
are required to hold bond hearings in every case, and either banning or 
permitting judges to release arrestees on their own recognizance would not 
add any “fiscal or administrative burden” to the state.85 Last, Faulkner argued 
that other federal district courts have ruled similar provisions of law 
unconstitutional.86 He analogized Article 334.4 to the Adam Walsh 
Amendments (“AWA”),87 which require certain bond conditions for 
defendants arrested for certain sexual offenses.88 Several federal courts have 
found these required conditions to violate procedural due process.89 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. at *10 (“Each of the three Mathews factors indicates that Article 
334.4’s per se rule violates procedural due process requirements.”). 
 81. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976). 
 82. Id. at 335. 
 83. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 
2014 WL 1876213 at *10 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014). 
 84. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 85. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 
2014 WL 1876213 at *10–11 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014). 
 86. Id. at *12. 
 87. The Adam Walsh Amendments and the myriad bond conditions 
contained within them are codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1). 
 88. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 
2014 WL 1876213 at *12 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014). 
 89. Id. at *12–13 (citing United States v. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350, 360 
(N.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[The mandatory condition] universally forfeits an accused’s 
opportunity to contest whether such conditions are necessary to ensure his return 
and to ameliorate any danger to the community.”); United States v. Torres, 566 F. 
Supp. 2d 591, 596–99 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (“[The law] prevents the courts from 
evaluating and setting relevant conditions of pretrial release, and, instead, 
mandates conditions which implicate significant liberty interests.”). 
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C. State Response 
In its response, Louisiana denied each of Faulkner’s claims.90 The state 
argued that Faulkner’s claim that he had a right to an individualized bond 
hearing was a mischaracterization of federal law.91 It asserted that no 
defendant is entitled to considerations “beyond questions of the severity of the 
offense, the defendant’s flight risk, and his risk of danger to the community.”92 
The state argued that arrestees have no “absolute right” to bail93 and that to 
apply Mathews to an issue of bail determination would be inappropriate 
because Mathews is only properly applicable to issues where a “specific Due 
Process right . . . had been recognized and where the actions of the 
Government and the trial court defanged that right.”94 Louisiana further 
claimed that Pugh was distinguishable from the instant case.95 The state 
argued that the Fifth Circuit in Pugh objected to a hypothetical bond schedule 
where money bail would be fixed per offense.96 Because Article 334.4 is not 
a master bond schedule, but rather a ban on release on one’s own 
recognizance, the state argued that Pugh did not apply.97  
                                                                                                             
 90. Answer to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Faulkner 
v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 at *5 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014) 
(“Faulkner’s claims, and the arguments in support thereof, lack merit and are 
based on a wholesale mischaracterization of controlling federal precedent as well 
as a fundamental misunderstanding of the rationale behind the Excessive Bail 
Clause.”). 
 91. Id. at *6–7 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987)) 
(“The ‘individualized inquiry’ relevant to the decision whether, and on what 
conditions, to admit a defendant to bail is limited to whether he or she poses a risk 
of flight or danger to the community if released pending trial, in light of the 
seriousness of his or her alleged conduct.”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at *8 (first citing Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644, 650 
(5th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is no absolute constitutional right to bail.”); then citing 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752 (“The Eighth Amendment . . . of course, says nothing 
about whether bail shall be available at all.”)). 
 94. Id. at *7–8 (first citing United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 
2004); then citing United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 597 (W.D. Tex. 
2008) (“The [Mathews] inquiry involves a two step analysis. First, the court must 
identify the existence of a protected liberty or property interest.”)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at *8. 
 97. Id. at *9 (“The Pugh court’s concern about the constitutionality of setting a 
monetary bond based on a master bond schedule ‘without meaningful consideration 
of other possible alternatives’ simply does not bear upon the issue presently before 
this Court, let alone bolster Faulkner’s argument.”). 
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Furthermore, the state argued that Faulkner’s reference to AWA 
jurisprudence was unavailing.98 First, the state noted that federal district courts 
were not united in rejecting the statute’s provisions as unconstitutional.99 
Second, it claimed that the AWA “created appreciably more onerous burdens” 
on the liberty of those whom it affected than Article 334.4.100 It argued that 
Faulkner could be released by the payment of bond, at which point he would 
not experience liberty restrictions; Article 334.4 only “deprived Faulkner of . 
. . the privilege of being released on his own recognizance.”101  
Finally, the state disputed Faulkner’s claim that his bond was 
unconstitutionally excessive.102 The state’s central argument was that 
“prohibitions on the type of bonds available to a particular defendant have no 
bearing on the excessiveness of the defendant’s bail because the question of 
excessiveness is one of amount.”103 It argued that the United States Supreme 
Court in Salerno prohibited only bail that is unreasonably high or bail that is 
denied without an explanation.104 The state claimed that Article 334.4 does 
neither of these things and therefore cannot be in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.105 
                                                                                                             
 98. Id. at *11. 
 99. Id. (first citing United States v. Frederick, 10-30021, 2010 WL 2179102 
(D.S.D. May 27, 2010); then citing United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 
(E.D. Cal. 2009); then citing United States v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D. 
Mont. 2009); then citing United States v. Crites, 09-262, 2009 WL 2982782 (D. 
Neb. Sept. 11, 2009); and then citing United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 
1025 (N.D. Cal. 2007)). 
 100. Answer to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Faulkner 
v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 at *5 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014) (“The 
Torres court identified the liberty interests at stake therein as the ‘right to remove 
from one place to another according to inclination’ and the ‘decision to remain in 
a public place of [one’s] choice.’”). 
 101. Id. at *14–15. 
 102. Id. at *13. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at *14–15. 
 105. Id. (“What art. 334.4 does not do is deny Faulkner bail altogether or establish 
prophylactically an excessive amount of bail due to his purported commission of an 
enumerated offense. Art. 334.4 likewise does not deny Faulkner a hearing at which 
the magistrate or district judge sets an amount of bail appropriate to assure his 
appearance at trial, based on his particular propensities for flight and danger to the 
community and in light of the seriousness of his offense.”). 
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D. Petitioner Response to the State 
Faulkner disputed the state’s claim that Mathews was inapplicable.106 He 
claimed that a Mathews analysis was relevant if Faulkner had an interest and 
not necessarily a right to release.107 As such, he claimed that Article 334.4 
implicated procedural due process.108 Faulkner argued that because he had an 
interest in release, “the state must provide him with minimal procedural 
protections before denying him release.”109 Faulkner argued once more that 
Pugh was applicable.110 He interpreted the Pugh court’s dicta that to deny an 
indigent arrestee pretrial release when that arrestee’s appearance at court 
could “reasonably be assured by one of the alternate forms of release”111 to 
mean that certain people have a right to be released on their own 
recognizance.112 Faulkner emphasized that the rarity of statutes like Article 
334.4 in other states is responsible for a dearth of case law on the topic113 and 
                                                                                                             
 106. Reply to the State’s Answer to the Petition for Habeas Corpus, Faulkner 
v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 at *1 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014). 
 107. Id. (“The state’s argument is based on the faulty assumption that the due 
process protections recognized in Mathews v. Eldridge do not apply in this case 
because Mr. Faulkner has no right to be released on his own recognizance. But 
the state’s argument misses the point because the issue in a Mathews analysis is 
not whether Mr. Faulkner has a right to release—it is whether he has an interest 
in being released. And the Supreme Court has recognized that criminal defendants 
have a liberty interest—if not a right—in being released pending trial.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at *2. (“The Court, in fact, has specifically rejected the state’s 
suggestion that Mathews applies only when an individual has a right to a certain 
type of relief. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (applying due 
process protections to parole revocation hearings).”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1058 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 112. Reply to the State’s Answer to the Petition for Habeas Corpus, Faulkner 
v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 at *3 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014) (“A 
Fifth Circuit panel overturned the Florida statute because it failed to codify a 
presumption in favor of recognizance bonds. The en banc court reversed, but only 
because the court wanted to give Florida judges the opportunity to adopt a 
preference for recognizance bonds. And Pugh’s reasoning leaves little doubt that 
the court disapproved of recognizance restrictions.”). 
 113. Id. at 4 (“[T]he state is left only with the argument that Abuhamra is not 
directly on point. True. But this is likely because Article 334.4 is such an 
uncommon statute.”). 
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claimed that all statutes that ban release on one’s own recognizance have been 
overturned by state courts.114 
E. The Court’s Ruling 
The federal district court, siding with the state on every issue, denied 
Faulkner’s petition.115 The court found that to sustain a facial challenge to 
Article 334.4, Faulkner needed to prove that the law is “unconstitutional in all 
of its applications.”116 To prove this unconstitutionality, Faulkner needed to 
show that Article 334.4 had no “plainly legitimate sweep,” or that the article 
did not rationally further any government interest.117 The court noted that 
facial challenges are “disfavored,” because “they raise the risk of ‘premature 
interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones records.’”118  
The court held that Article 334.4 did not violate procedural due 
process.119 It ruled that to sustain a procedural due process challenge, Faulkner 
needed to prove that “Article 334.4 [was] procedurally inadequate in all, or 
nearly all, of its applications, not as applied to a particular set of 
defendants.”120 The court found that Article 334.4 did not deprive arrestees of 
a liberty interest, because it neither mandated pretrial detention nor sets a 
minimum bond amount.121 Central to the court’s reasoning was the claim that 
even if Article 334.4 bars judges from releasing pretrial detainees on their own 
recognizance, those judges may set “very low, even nominal, money 
bonds.”122 The court quoted a state judge as saying “the DA’s office is right 
in their argument that we can set the bond as low as we want. . . . [I can] give 
him a bond of . . . $1,000, $500 or . . . $10.”123  
                                                                                                             
 114. Id. at 9 (first citing State v. Blake, 642 So. 2d 959 (Ala. 1994); then citing 
State v. Raymond, 906 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2005); and then citing Clark v. Hall, 53 
P.3d 416 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002)). 
 115. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213, at *1 (E.D. La. May 
9, 2014).  
 116. Id. at *2 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 
552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (quoting Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004)).  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at *3. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at *9. 
 123. Id. at *2 (“A defendant charged with one of Article 334.4’s enumerated 
offenses may argue that the statutory factors favor a low or nominal money bond 
in his case. If the judge agrees, she may set bond in an amount the defendant can 
satisfy, be it a hundred dollars or ten dollars or even ten cents. If the judge does 
not agree, and concludes that the defendant poses a flight risk or a danger to the 
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The Eastern District found that the state’s procedures were 
constitutionally sufficient and asserted that even if Article 334.4 affected 
a liberty interest, the risk of that interest being erroneously deprived would 
be so low that it would not implicate procedural due process.124 The court 
noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure instructs judges to consider ten 
separate factors when assigning bail125 and reiterated that judges were still 
free to set nominal bail amounts, because Article 334.4 prohibits only 
release on the arrestee’s recognizance.126 Because Faulkner mounted a 
facial challenge to the law, the court interpreted the law in the most lenient 
manner.127 Although the court recognized that situations might arise in 
which poverty led to unconstitutional discrimination, Faulkner’s facial 
challenge meant that the court was unable to entertain hypothetical 
cases128: “The only circumstance in which this might plausibly occur is 
when the defendant is unable to post even a de minimis money bond. In 
ruling on Faulkner's facial challenge, however, the Court may not 
‘speculate about “hypothetical” or “imaginary” cases.’”129 
Finally, the court found that Article 334.4 serves a legitimate state 
interest by protecting the public.130 The court found that the state 
legislature intended to “signal[] to judges . . . [the importance of the] 
potential flight risk or threat to public safety,” but, nonetheless, it accepted 
that it only “serves the State’s interest in public safety to a slight degree.”131 
                                                                                                             
community, then Article 334.4 is unlikely to have any effect, as the judge would 
likely set a money bond even in the absence of Article 334.4.”). 
 124. Id. at *3. 
 125. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 311 (2016). 
 126. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213, at *4 (E.D. La. 
May 9, 2014). 
 127. Id. at *2 (“For purposes of Faulkner’s facial challenge, the Court must 
assume that judges will apply the statutorily mandated factors in good faith when 
setting bail for defendants charged with one of Article 334.4’s enumerated 
offenses.”). 
 128. For example, the possibility of an event being “capable of repetition, yet 
evading review,” as in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), or the hypothetical case 
central to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th 
Cir. 1978). 
 129. Id. at *2 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 
552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)). 
 130. Id. at *5 (“[T]he Louisiana legislature determined that these offenses are 
of sufficient gravity, and occasion a sufficient flight risk or risk of danger to the 
community, to warrant mandatory imposition of a money bond.”). 
 131. Id. The court found that “the State has no evident fiscal or administrative 
interest in Article 334.4’s per se bond restrictions, since judges could easily 
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Given the serious effects of pretrial detention, the court’s acceptance of 
Article 334.4 is troubling. Additionally, the court’s willingness to permit the 
continued existence of the article raises constitutional concerns. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 334.4 
In spite of the Faulkner court’s ruling, Article 334.4 implicates issues 
of due process and equal protection. Analysis of state data indicates that 
judges do not set nominal bonds.132 Additionally, because Faulkner made 
a facial challenge to Article 334.4, the court interpreted the article with the 
most leniency.133 The article may still deny certain classes of arrestees, 
especially the homeless, their rights to equal protection and due process. 
A. Louisiana Bond Data Shows That Judges Do Not Set Nominal Bonds 
The argument accepted by the court in Faulkner that judges are capable 
of setting nominal bonds does not rescue Article 334.4’s constitutionality. 
Although judges theoretically have discretion to set bail at very low 
amounts, the data does not show a history of judges setting low bails in 
cases such as these—their practice is to set bail that is out of reach for 
many indigent detainees, even when those detainees pose little safety or 
flight risks.134 Second, even setting a very low bail assumes that an arrestee 
has some ability to pay. Given the frequency of homeless citizens being 
arrested,135 this assumption is not reasonable, and it denies equal 
protection to defendants who are unable to pay even one cent to secure 
their release. The existence of limited judicial discretion cannot invalidate 
the equal protection concerns implicated by Article 334.4. 
                                                                                                             
consider the appropriateness of non-money bonds at the hearings already being 
held.” Id. 
 132. See infra Part III.A. 
 133. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213, at *3 (E.D. La. 
May 9, 2014) (“For purposes of Faulkner’s facial challenge, the Court must 
assume that judges will apply the statutorily mandated factors in good faith when 
setting bail for defendants charged with one of Article 334.4’s enumerated 
offenses.”). 
 134. Faulkner, whose case was discussed exhaustively in Part II, is such an 
example. 
 135. See generally Greg A. Greenberg & Robert A. Rosenheck, Jail Incarceration, 
Homelessness, and Mental Health: A National Study, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SVCS. 170 
(2008).  
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1. Explanation of Statistical Analysis 
An examination of bond data shows that judges do not set nominal 
bonds when assessing bonds for arrestees accused of possession with 
intent to distribute marijuana.136 The Louisiana Public Defender Board 
maintains a database to track representation statistics.137 Bond data is not 
a required field and therefore is frequently unreported; however, many 
attorneys in the 15th Judicial District—a district including the city of 
Lafayette—report this data.138  
A query to the Louisiana Public Defender Board’s database seeking 
arrestees charged in the 15th Judicial District with possession with intent 
to distribute marijuana between September 1, 2013 and September 1, 2015 
returns 52 results with bond data included.139 Of these, one bond was set 
at zero dollars, in contravention of Article 334.4—this data point has been 
discounted in the analysis. Because the database query returned all persons 
accused of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, regardless of 
what other crimes they were charged with, the remaining 51 data points 
were divided into three groups for analysis. Group A consists of all 51 data 
points and includes every individual charged with possession with intent 
to distribute marijuana, regardless of other charges. Group B consists of 
all arrestees charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana 
along with simple possession or possession with intent to distribute other 
drugs. This group consists of 18 data points.140 Group C consists only of 
arrestees charged with possession with the intent to distribute marijuana 
                                                                                                             
 136. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 (2016) governs possession of marijuana 
with intent to distribute. 
 137. See Memorandum from Jean M. Faria, State Public Defender, to the Louisiana 
Public Defender Board (Nov. 30, 2009), http://lpdb.la.gov/Serving%20The 
%20Public/Reports/txtfiles/pdf/SPD%20Report%20for%20December%202009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NT6J -J9A3] (regarding, in part, the introduction of the database to the 
various district defender offices and the subsequent training in its use). 
 138. It is possible that other judicial districts function very differently from the 
15th. Unfortunately, because bond data is not currently a required field, it is 
necessary to extrapolate from the 15th to obtain a picture of bond practices 
statewide. This lack of data underscores the need for state-wide mandated 
reporting of bond practices. 
 139. Access to the Louisiana Public Defender Board database is granted at the 
discretion of the State Public Defender. See Appendix, infra. All calculations used 
in this Comment involving the bond data are rounded to the nearest dollar.  
 140. One arrestee, who was arrested with a truly remarkable number and 
variety of controlled substances on his person, has been excluded from this group 
on the grounds that the group is intended to reflect typical drug-based arrests 
where an arrestee may have had more than one controlled substance on his person. 
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and consists of ten data points.141 The crime with which an arrestee is 
charged affects a judge’s bond determination.142 This division allows for 
more accurate analysis by controlling for people charged with crimes other 
than possession with the intent to distribute marijuana.  
2. Bond Data from the 15th Judicial District 
The three groups vary significantly in their statistics. Group A has a 
minimum bail amount of $1,500 and a maximum of $170,000. The mean 
bail amount of Group A is $26,725, and the standard deviation143 is 
$31,047. Group B has a minimum bail amount of $1,500 and a maximum 
of $75,000. The mean bail amount of Group B is $22,778, and the standard 
deviation is $21,325. Group C has a minimum bail amount of $1,500 and 
a maximum of $36,000. The mean bail amount of group C is $14,350, and 
the standard deviation is $14,083. As is evident from the standard 
deviation, all groups display extreme variance. Group C displays the least 
variance in its lower two quartiles144—the range between Group C’s 
minimum to its median is only $4,750.  
The analyzed data shows that a magistrate in the 15th JDC has not 
assigned a “nominal” bond for arrestees charged with possession with 
intent to distribute in the past two years; none of the analyzed data shows 
any bond set below $1,500. Even bonds set on arrestees charged only with 
possession with intent to distribute marijuana were high; 70% of bonds set 
in Group C exceeded $3,125, and half of the arrestees in Group C were 
assessed a bond of $6,250 or greater. Bond amounts increased 
dramatically when other drug charges are added; 72% of bonds set in 
Group B exceeded $5,250, and half of the arrestees in that group were 
assessed a bond of $18,000 or greater. 
                                                                                                             
 141. Persons charged under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1041, which prohibits 
the collection of money from sales of controlled substances, have not been 
excluded, because the collection of money from the sale of marijuana is a logical 
conclusion of the attempt to sell marijuana. 
 142. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 311 (2016). 
 143. Standard deviation is a measurement of variation among data. A low 
standard deviation indicates that data points are generally close to the mean. A 
higher standard deviation indicates that the data set has more variance. For further 
analysis of the data, including a box-and-whiskers plot of all datasets, see the 
information appended to this article. 
 144. A data set may be broken into four quartiles for purposes of analysis. Each 
quartile represents one fourth of the total data. The lower two quartiles of a data 
set comprise the bottom half of the data. 
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The Faulkner court assumed “that judges will apply the statutorily 
mandated factors in good faith when setting bail for defendants charged 
with one of Article 334.4’s enumerated offenses.”145 The court also 
accepted the assertion of a state judge who claimed that judges may set 
nominal bonds.146 The available data, however, does not support this 
assumption. Instead, the available data supports the claim that Article 
334.4 influences judges to assess high bonds. 
B. Article 334.4 Potentially Violates Procedural Due Process 
Procedural due process is “the opportunity to be heard . . . at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”147 Article 334.4 denies 
certain classes of arrestees the ability to be heard “in a meaningful 
manner” during bail determinations. Rather than being afforded the 
opportunity to present a case for why they should be released on their own 
recognizance, arrestees are forced into surety bonds that leave them in 
prison, regardless of their individual circumstances. Their demonstration of 
ties to the community, indigence, and relative risk cannot be considered 
when determining the appropriateness of recognizance, because Article 
334.4 flatly forbids release on recognizance. Therefore, their attempts to 
avoid lengthy incarceration are not “meaningful,” because judges have no 
discretion to release them on their own recognizance. 
Because Faulkner did not prove that Article 334.4 was unconstitutional 
in every application and lacked any “plainly legitimate sweep,”148 his facial 
challenge failed.149 The fact that Article 334.4 is not unconstitutional in 
every application, however, does not logically lead to the claim that Article 
334.4 cannot be unconstitutional in any application. There exists a class of 
people whose procedural due process rights may be imperiled by 
application of Article 334.4.  
The extremely indigent, such as the homeless, might not be able to pay 
any amount of money, no matter how small. When such an arrestee is used 
as the basis for a Mathews test, significant doubts are cast on the 
constitutionality of Article 334.4. Although it is admittedly unlikely that a 
                                                                                                             
 145. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213, at *3 (E.D. La. 
May 9, 2014). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (holding that due process required a hearing before the 
termination of welfare). 
 148. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213, at *2 (E.D. La. 
May 9, 2014). 
 149. Id. at *6. 
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homeless person would have the capital necessary to begin selling drugs, 
Article 334.4 bans release on one’s own recognizance for several other 
crimes that require no money, such as aggravated cruelty to animals.150 
The Faulkner court’s argument that Article 334.4 fails to deprive arrestees 
of a liberty interest collapses when an extremely indigent defendant cannot 
pay any amount of bond, because the article then mandates pretrial 
detention.151 Under the first Mathews factor, this scenario indicates a due 
process violation. 
The second factor of Mathews—the risk of the arrestee being 
erroneously deprived of his liberty interest152—becomes much greater 
when a person without any money—for instance, a person who is 
homeless—is arrested. Because Article 344.4 is a total ban on bail without 
surety, a judge in such a situation would be required to detain the arrestee 
until trial. The second half of the factor—the “probable value, if any, of 
additional procedural safeguards”153—is simple. Additional procedural 
safeguards would simply be the ability of the court to use its own 
discretion to release an arrestee on his own recognizance. The value of 
such a safeguard is immediately apparent; the court would be able to 
prevent the pretrial detention of persons unable to pay any amount of bail. 
The court in Faulkner noted that such a possibility existed, but was by 
itself insufficient to sustain a facial challenge.154 The second factor 
indicates the constitutional insufficiency of Article 334.4. 
The third and final factor—the interest of the government155—is 
unpersuasive. Even if one were to assume, in spite of the available data, 
that judges did frequently assign nominal bonds, Article 334.4 serves no 
particular use. Were judges to regularly use their discretion to assign 
nominal bonds in cases where they would otherwise grant release on one’s 
own recognizance, the article would at best be ineffective. Article 334.4 is 
troubling, because the Mathews test indicates an unconstitutional 
application if a truly indigent person were subject to its ban on bail without 
surety.  
In Salerno, the United States Supreme Court held that the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984 fell within a narrow range of exceptions to the standard that 
“liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the 
carefully limited exception.”156 The Court reasoned that the Act was 
                                                                                                             
 150. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.1 (2016); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334.4 (2016). 
 151. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334.4 (2016). 
 152. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Faulkner, 2014 WL 1876213, at *5–6. 
 155. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321. 
 156. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
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attended by “numerous procedural safeguards,” which served to protect it 
from a facial challenge.157 These safeguards included the analysis by the court 
of “statutorily enumerated factors, which include the nature and the 
circumstances of the charges, the weight of the evidence, the history and 
characteristics of the putative offender, and the danger to the community.”158 
The Faulkner court asserted that it was appropriate for the Louisiana 
legislature to determine that certain offenses are too dangerous to allow 
release on one’s own recognizance;159 however, to issue such a blanket ban 
denies arrestees their due process rights to have ameliorating factors 
considered by the court. 
C. Article 334.4 Potentially Violates Equal Protection 
In addition to violating due process, Article 334.4 implicates issues of 
equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Equal Protection Clause to mean “there can be no equal justice where the 
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”160 Yet, 
Article 334.4 would condemn the utterly indigent to a lengthy pretrial 
detention, while those with money would leave prison with ease. In recent 
years, bail schedules have been successfully challenged under the Equal 
Protection Clause.161 Challenges to Article 334.4 are analogous to these 
claims. When indigent detainees cannot be released on their own 
recognizance and cannot provide surety, they are subject to pretrial 
confinement despite the fact that bail without surety might well be 
appropriate. 
In Varden v. City of Clanton, the United States filed a Statement of 
Interest arguing against the appropriateness of fixed bail schedules.162 The 
reasoning of the United States is highly applicable to Article 334.4. The 
United States argued that “the [Supreme] Court’s Fourteenth Amendment 
analysis applies in equal, if not greater, force to individuals who are 
detained until trial because of inability to pay fixed-sum bail amounts. 
Liberty is particularly salient for defendants awaiting trial, who have not 
                                                                                                             
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 751–52. 
 159. Faulkner, 2014 WL 1876213, at *15. 
 160. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
 161. See, e.g., Snow v. Lambert, 2015 WL 5071981 (M.D. La. 2015) (holding 
that an Ascension Parish woman was impermissibly subjected to a fixed bail 
schedule because her indigence prevented her from paying). 
 162. Statement of Interest of the United States, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 
2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (N.D. Ala. filed Jan. 15, 2015). 
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been found guilty of any crime.”163 Although the United States admitted 
that certain situations require imprisonment before trial, it maintained that 
fixed-bail schedules do not permit judges to take into account the 
“individual circumstances of the accused” and require pretrial detention 
for arrestees too indigent to afford the demanded fee.164 Similar to these 
schedules, Article 334.4 does not permit judges to take into account the 
poverty of a person who cannot pay even a nominal fee. 
The Equal Protection Clause may protect the poor in criminal matters 
more than in other contexts. The United States Supreme Court has 
specifically ruled that “[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate 
on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.”165 
Because pretrial detention statistically correlates to higher conviction 
rates,166 keeping prisoners incarcerated before trial solely because they are 
incapable of paying contravenes the principle set forth in Griffin that “the 
ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence and [can]not be used as an excuse to 
deprive a defendant of a fair trial.”167 In addition to violating equal 
protection, Article 334.4 likely violates the constitutional prohibition on 
excessive bail. 
D. Article 334.4 Potentially Violates the Eighth Amendment Prohibition 
on Excessive Bail 
Salerno established that “when the Government has admitted that its 
only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a sum 
designed to ensure that goal, and no more.”168 Although Louisiana law 
specifies that public safety must be considered when setting bail, bail 
exists to ensure an arrestee’s presence at court.169 If an individual’s 
circumstances were such that a judge would, but for Article 334.4, release 
that person on his or her own recognizance, the imposition of even a 
nominal bond would violate the Salerno principle. 
Article 334.4 has several unconstitutional defects. First, because it 
does not allow arrestees to present their case for release on recognizance 
in a meaningful manner, the article violates the rights of the detained to 
procedural due process. Second, the vastly disproportionate pretrial 
                                                                                                             
 163. Id. at 8. 
 164. Id. at 8–9. 
 165. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17. 
 166. See infra note 171. 
 167. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17–18. 
 168. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987). 
 169. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334 (2016). 
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outcomes between the monied and the wholly indigent indicate a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause. Third, the article may violate the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition on excessive bail. However, even if Article 334.4 
were entirely constitutional, its significant negative effects would still 
require its repeal as a matter of prudent policy. 
IV. THE CASE FOR REPEAL: ARTICLE 334.4 AND 
ITS DELETERIOUS EFFECTS 
As shown by the Faulkner ruling, federal courts applying Louisiana 
law are unable to entertain facial challenges to Article 334.4 because not 
all applications of the rule are unconstitutional. The only viable option to 
overturn the Article would be to have a defendant so poor that he or she 
would be incapable of paying any bond. Additionally, mootness and 
ripeness issues make the challenge of even an ideal defendant difficult.170 
The proper solution to the problem of Article 334.4 is to have the 
Louisiana legislature repeal it. Article 334.4 is bad policy, and its 
enforcement leads to several unforeseen consequences. 
A. Article 334.4 Affects the Outcomes of Trials by Mandating Expensive 
Pretrial Detention 
The Arnold Foundation has published several studies on the effects of 
pretrial detention.171 Defendants who are detained until trial are 
significantly more likely to be sentenced to jail than those who are released 
before their trial.172 Additionally, those who are detained until trial receive 
                                                                                                             
 170. See supra Part I.E. 
 171. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF 
PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES 4 (2013), http://www.arnoldfounda 
tion.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_FNL.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/CY5S-6U6H] [hereinafter INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT]; CHRISTOPHER T. 
LOWENKAMP ET AL., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 19 (2013), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads /2014/02/LJAF_Report_hidden-
costs_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7UB-PUFL] [hereinafter HIDDEN COSTS OF 
PRETRIAL DETENTION].  
 172. INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT, supra note 171 (“Defendants who are 
detained for the entire pretrial period are much more likely to be sentenced to jail 
and prison. Low-risk defendants who are detained for the entire pretrial period are 
5.41 times more likely to be sentenced to jail and 3.76 times more likely to be 
sentenced to prison when compared to low-risk defendants who are released at 
some point before trial or case disposition. Moderate and high-risk defendants 
who are detained for the entire pretrial period are approximately 3 times more 
likely to be incarcerated than similar defendants who are released at some point.”). 
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longer sentences, with low-risk defendants experiencing the greatest 
disparity in sentences.173 This difference in sentencing may be due to 
desperation on the part of the defendant who is confined, which causes the 
defendant to accept plea agreements that a non-incarcerated person would 
refuse.174 This disparity is serious cause for concern, especially given that 
the United States Supreme Court has affirmed that “there can be no equal 
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money 
he has.”175  
Heightened risk for conviction and sentencing is not the only 
damaging effect of the pretrial incarceration that Article 334.4 causes. 
There is a statistically significant link between pretrial incarceration and 
recidivism.176 Additionally, recent research calls into question the effect 
of pretrial incarceration on rates of appearance in court.177 Given the 
                                                                                                             
 173. Id. at 10 (“When other relevant statistical controls are considered, 
defendants detained until trial or case disposition are 4.44 times more likely to be 
sentenced to jail and 3.32 times more likely to be sentenced to prison than 
defendants who are released at some point pending trial. The jail sentence is 2.78 
times longer for defendants who are detained for the entire pretrial period, and the 
prison sentence is 2.36 times longer.”). 
 174. RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE 
MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 14 (2015), http://vera.org/sites/default/files 
/resources/downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report_02.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/4ZLE-YHDG] (“Earlier research ha[s] noted that those held pretrial may be more 
likely to receive custodial as well as longer sentences because defendants already 
in jail receive and accept less favorable plea agreements and do not have the 
leverage to press for better ones.”). 
 175. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
 176. HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION, supra note 171 (“Being 
detained for the entire pretrial period is related to the likelihood of post-
disposition recidivism. When other relevant statistical controls are considered, 
pretrial detention had a statistically significant and positive (meaning increasing) 
effect on 12-month [new criminal activity post-disposition] and 24-month [new 
criminal activity post-disposition]. Defendants detained pretrial were 1.3 times 
more likely to recidivate compared to defendants who were released at some point 
pending trial. This association could indicate that there are unknown factors that 
cause both detention and recidivism, but it is an association worthy of further 
exploration.”). 
 177. Id. at 10 (“Overall, when other relevant statistical controls are considered, 
defendants who are detained 2 to 3 days pretrial are slightly more likely to [fail to 
appear] than defendants who are detained 1 day (1.09 times more likely). Examining 
sub-populations of defendants revealed significant differences, however, in the 
impact of length of pretrial detention when considering defendant risk level. 
Specifically, low-risk defendants are more likely to [fail to appear] if they are 
detained 2 to 3 days (1.22 times more likely than low-risk defendants detained 1 
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current data, the government interest in having arrestees appear in court 
and in protecting the public actually appears to be thwarted, and not 
furthered, by pretrial detention.  
Pretrial detention does not only affect the justice system; it affects the 
treasury as well. In 2015, the city of New Orleans estimated a daily cost 
of $97 per prisoner in its parish prisons.178 In the same year, East Baton 
Rouge Parish, which sends prisoners to other parishes as a result of jail 
overcrowding, estimated a cost daily of $60–70 per prisoner.179 With an 
inmate population in the thousands in both cities,180 any change to pretrial 
detention rates will play a significant factor in municipal budgets. 
B. Revisions of Article 334.4 Will Be Ineffective 
Alternatives to the repeal of Article 334.4 would be ineffective. One 
alternative would be to rewrite the article to order that judges keep in mind 
the severity of the enumerated crimes currently contained within the article 
when assessing bond. However, the first factor of Louisiana Code of Criminal 
Procedure Article 334 requires judges to assess “[t]he seriousness of the 
offense charged, including but not limited to whether the offense is a crime of 
violence or involves a controlled dangerous substance.”181 Rewriting Article 
334.4 in such a manner would prove redundant. 
Another alternative would be to urge judges to assess more nominal 
bonds. Although preferable to the current state of affairs, this alternative 
seems a tortuous circumvention of a needless law. If judges were to assign 
more nominal bonds, and assuming arguendo that all arrestees were able 
                                                                                                             
day or less), 4 to 7 days (1.22 times more likely), and 15 to 30 days (1.41 times 
more likely).”). 
 178. Paul Purpura, Jackson Square Shooter’s Odyssey at Orleans Parish 
Prison Finally  Ends ,  T IMES P ICAYUNE  (Jul .  29, 2015 ,  9:19 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/07/jackson_square_shooters_orlean. 
html [https://perma.cc /7EWE-ZQ6J]. It should be noted that this estimation took 
place before the opening of a new multimillion dollar facility, which replaced 
several aging jails in the parish. For more information on the New Orleans Parish 
jail facility, see Jonathan Bullington, First Inmates Arrive at Orleans Parish New 
J a i l  F a c i l i t y ,  T I M E S  P I C A Y U N E  ( S e p t .  1 4 ,  2 0 1 5 ,  1 2 : 4 1  P M ) , 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/09/orleans_parish_jail_opens.html 
[https://perma.cc/AKN5-XQZD].  
 179. Prison Privatization Might Save Baton Rouge Money, But is There a Higher 
Cost?, TIMES PICAYUNE (Feb. 1, 2015, 2:40 AM), http://www.nola.com /news/baton-
rouge/index.ssf/2015/01/baton_rouge_private_prison_tax.html [https//per ma.cc/CM 
S2-NY2M]. 
 180. Purpura, supra note 178; see also id. 
 181. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334 (2016). 
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to pay such bonds, the net effect would be identical to allowing judges to 
release arrestees on their own recognizance.  
C. Article 334.4 Must be Repealed 
Arguments in support of Article 334.4 are unavailing. Repealing the 
article will not prohibit judges from denying release on one’s own 
recognizance; rather, repealing the article will allow judges to use their 
own discretion on the matter. The fact that homeless members of society 
can be more difficult to locate for trial than their more fortunate 
counterparts is indisputable, but repealing Article 334.4 would mean only 
that judges would consider this factor when determining whether to grant 
bail in such cases. Were Article 334.4 repealed, a judge would be free to 
deny release on recognizance—or indeed, even mandate pretrial 
detention—for a homeless arrestee who posed a risk of flight or 
recidivism. However, the same judge would be able to grant release on 
recognizance for a homeless arrestee found to be a negligible flight risk 
under such a regime. As to the potential argument that incarceration would 
somehow be preferable to being homeless, there exist multiple homeless 
shelters across the state that provide much healthier accommodations than 
parish prison facilities—many of which the U.S. Department of Justice has 
taken over via consent decrees, alleging inadequate protection from 
violence and sexual assault, inadequate suicide protection, inadequate 
medical and mental health care, and other severe constitutional 
deficiencies.182 
Article 334.4 is at best a meaningless legislative gesture. If under the 
current statute judges are assessing nominal bail at the same rate that they 
released arrestees on their own recognizance before Article 334.4, the only 
change is that extremely indigent arrestees are being needlessly denied 
freedom; otherwise, the court is currently releasing the same arrestees it 
would under the previous statutory scheme. If, however, the article is 
causing judges to assess bail at a higher rate than before its passage, it is 
causing needless, expensive, and unjust incarceration. Article 334.4 
accomplishes nothing of value and should be repealed. 
CONCLUSION 
Article 334.4 allows for a situation in which the indigent may languish 
in jail while their peers, identical to them in all regards save wealth, are 
                                                                                                             
 182. Letter from the U.S. Department of Justice to Marlin N. Gusman, Orleans 
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freed pending trial. It implicates issues of due process, equal protection, 
and excessive bail. By establishing a prophylactic ban on bail without 
surety, Article 334.4 denies arrestees their due process right to a fair 
consideration of the statutory bail factors. It keeps the penniless in prison 
solely because they cannot afford to pay a bond amount, in violation of the 
principles of equal protection. It imposes excessive bail on defendants for 
whom, but for the existence of the article, judges would assess a nominal 
bond. Data shows that the resulting pretrial incarceration leads to 
deleterious outcomes, both for the imprisoned and for society at large, by 
affecting the conviction rates and sentence lengths of the accused. To do 
nothing in the face of such information is irresponsible. The Louisiana 
legislature should act to improve the equity of the state criminal justice 
system by repealing Article 334.4. 
 
Gabriel Loupe 
  
                                                                                                             
  J.D./D.C.L., 2017, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
Special thanks are owed to Orleans Public Defenders, whose efforts in managing the 
effects of Article 334.4 on their clients provided the seed for this Comment.  
140 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
 
 
APPENDIX: LOUISIANA BOND DATA  
Group A (All arrestees charged with possession with intent to 
distribute marijuana and any other offense) 
 Mean: $26,725 
 Standard deviation: $31,047 
 Minimum: $1,500 
 1st Quartile: $6,000 
 Median: $19,250 
 3rd Quartile: $36,000 
 Maximum: $170,000 
 
Group B (Arrestees charged with possession with intent to distribute 
marijuana and any other drug offense) 
 Mean: $22,778 
 Standard deviation: $21,325 
 Minimum: $1,500 
 1st Quartile: $5,250 
 Median: $18,000 
 3rd Quartile: $33,250 
 Maximum: $75,000 
 
Group C (Arrestees charged with possession with intent to distribute 
marijuana only) 
 Mean: $14,350 
 Standard deviation: $14,083 
 Minimum: $1,500 
 1st Quartile: $3,125 
 Median: $6,250 
 3rd Quartile: $24,375 
 Maximum: $36,000 
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